The Impact of Initialization Keys on The Security of Symmetric Ciphers in  5G and 4G Generations

Khalid Fadhil Jasim

Cihan University-Erbil Conferences, 3rd International Conference on Communication Engineering and Computer Science (CIC-COCOS’19)

The Impact of Initialization Keys on The Security of Symmetric Ciphers in 5G and 4G Generations

Khalid Fadhil Jasim

Last modified: 2019-04-24

Abstract

This research presents analysis and investigation of some symmetric cipher algorithms which have been proposed for the security of 5G and 4G mobile generations. The research starts with overview of various features, standards and services offered by 5G and 4G technologies. Moreover, the design and architecture of some symmetric cipher algorithms (e.g. AES, SNOW 3G, and ZUC) are also analyzed. In this context, the initialization keys, used in encryption and decryption phases, possess crucial role in the security of these ciphers. Also, different components such as mathematical transformations, LFSR registers, finite state machines, substitution boxes as well as IV and secret keys have been discussed. Cryptanalysis attacks which can be applied against these ciphers were investigated. Some weaknesses in the initialization operations, IV key and secret key were pointed out. Therefore, some solutions were proposed to improve the security of these cipher algorithms for 5G and 4G generations.

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